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The Reform of the International Monetary Fund
(Conditionality and Surveillance)
FRANois GIANVITI*
Reform of the Fund or reform by the Fund? These two questions are inextricably linked.
Since its creation, through decisions of its organs or amendments of its charter, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (Fund) has gradually expanded its role. Although its main respon-
sibilities remain the stability of exchange rates, the effective operation of the international
monetary system, and the avoidance of restrictions on current payments, the achievement
of these objectives has gradually led to an ever greater involvement in its members' external
and internal policies.
The main tools of this involvement are surveillance and conditionality. Surveillance ap-
plies to all members. Initially limited to members' exchange restrictions, surveillance has
evolved and expanded to cover members' domestic economic and financial policies and
their external trade policies. This is because of the potential impact of surveillance on the
countries' balance of payments and the risk of exchange rate instability (including compet-
itive depreciation) or exchange restrictions, which would disrupt the orderly functioning of
the international monetary system.
Conditionality applies only to members using the Fund's resources. Under the Fund's
articles, a member may use the Fund's general resources to meet a balance of payments
problem (subject to certain limitations if the problem is a capital outflow), but the Fund must
make sure that its assistance will help the member correct its problem and that its resources
will be safeguarded. Therefore, as a condition of its financial assistance, the Fund defines the
policies that the member needs to implement. Failure to meet specified performance criteria
does not constitute a breach of obligation, but suspends the Fund's disbursements.
Through its conditionality and its surveillance, the Fund has become an active agent not
only of macroeconomic (fiscal and monetary) adjustment, but also of trade liberalization
and structural reforms. Understandably, as the Fund's role expands, criticisms of its actions
become more frequent. Some would prefer a less active Fund that is more respectful of
each member's domestic choices. Others would rather have a more active Fund, but only
to achieve objectives defined on their own terms and preferably in other countries.
*Franqois Gianviti is General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund. The opinions expressed in this
article, which is an updated version of a conference paper given on May 24, 1999, are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Fund.
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In the current discussions on the architecture of the international financial system, it is
clear that the Fund (together with other organizations) is being called upon to expand its
role and initiate certain changes. It is also clear that if there ever was a distinction between
the international monetary system (stability of exchange rates, transferability and convert-
ibility of currencies) and the international financial system (payments system, banking and
capital markets), the distinction is waning. For instance, the title of the Managing Director's
report to the Interim Committee, dated April 26, 1999, was "Progress in Strengthening
the Architecture of the International Financial System." When it was released to the press
and the public, however, the title of the pamphlet was "Progress on Strengthening the
Architecture of the International Monetary System." Although the latter title was more
consistent with the Fund's mandate to "oversee the international monetary system in order
to ensure its effective operation," the former was a more accurate description of the sub-
stance of the report.'
Since the reform of the Fund cannot be dissociated from its objectives, i.e., reform by
the Fund, those objectives must first be defined, after which the instruments available to
the Fund and their possible improvement will be examined.
I. Objectives of the Reform
The general objective of the reform is strengthening the international financial system
to prevent the recurrence of major financial crises like the recent ones in Mexico and East
Asia (Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia). This general objective must be broken
down into more specific objectives. In the Managing Director's report of April 26, 1999,
five main objectives were identified. They were:
to promote transparency and accountability, and to develop, disseminate and monitor imple-
mentation of better standards and best practices; to strengthen financial systems, including
through better supervision, and appropriate mechanisms for managing bank failures; to pay
greater attention to the orderly liberalization of capital markets; to involve the private sector
more fully in forestalling and resolving crises; to ensure that systemic issues are adequately
addressed, including the appropriate exchange rate regimes and the adequacy of the Fund's
resources.2
Those are the objectives identified by the Managing Director, but it does not mean that
all of them will be the Fund's responsibility. For example, the development of standards is
shared with other organizations, based on their respective competencies.
A. TRANSPARENcY, AcCOUNTABILITY, STANDARDS
1. Transparency and Accountability of the Fund
Access to Fund archives will be permitted after five years for Executive Board documents
and after twenty years for other documents (instead of thirty years as previously required).
There are a few exceptions. For instance, confidential documents furnished to the Fund by
1. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. 1501, at art. IV,
§ 3 (b) [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
2. Report of the Managing Director to the Interim Committee on Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of
the International Financial System (Apr. 26, 1999) (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/
1999/042699.htm>.
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external parties will not be communicated without their consent, and the archives of the
legal department will remain classified, but legal opinions given to the executive board will
be available.
External evaluations-Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), surveillance, and economic research-of Fund work have been
commissioned and published. The liquidity position of the Fund and the position of mem-
bers' accounts with the Fund are published on the Fund's website)
A distinction must be made between the views of the staff, which does not speak for the
Fund, and views of the Executive Board, which speaks for the Fund. For instance, in the
context of article IV consultations (i.e., annual consultations between each member and
the Executive Board), the staff prepares a report, which is circulated to the Executive Board.
The report reflects factual information, the views of the member's authorities, and the staff's
appraisal of the member's policies. The Executive Board then conducts and completes the
consultation on the basis of the staff report.
Under the Fund's Articles of Agreement, it may authorize the publication of the staff's
views, as they are not the views of the organization itself. In contrast, the views of the
Executive Board are those of the Fund and cannot be published without the member's
consent. Under article XII, section 8, the Fund may not publish its assessment of a member's
policies, except if they are a threat to the international monetary system. Even in that case,
the publication requires a seventy percent majority of the total voting power of the Exec-
utive Board. In practice, therefore, the member's consent will be necessary for publication
of the Fund's views on the member's policies. This publication is made in the form of a
Public Information Notice (PIN). As members become more willing to authorize such
publications of Fund views, a substantial majority of article IV consultations will give rise
to the publication of PINs.
With respect to staff reports, there has been some concern that if they were to be pub-
lished, members might be less willing to discuss sensitive issues with the staff and staff
appraisals of their policies might be less candid. As a test of the possible effect of publications
on the quality of staff reports, a pilot project with a few volunteer members has been
organized. It will be temporary (eighteen months, ending on October 4, 2000) and, de-
pending on the results, may or may not be generalized. In any case, the intention would be
not to publish a staff report on a member's policies without the member's consent.
Members' documents relating to requests to use Fund resources are mainly the letters of
intent, memoranda of economic and financial policies, and, in some cases, policy framework
papers that are submitted by a member in support of its request for financial assistance
from the Fund. As documents of the member, they may not be published except by the
member itself or with its consent. The Fund may not impose a legally binding obligation
on the member to publish such documents, but may make the publication a condition of
its assistance.
After an extensive discussion in the Executive Board, a compromise was reached. There
is a presumption that the member's documents will be published. The member may decide
otherwise, for example, by explaining that, in its judgment, they contain market-sensitive
information that should not be disclosed.
3. The International Monetary Fund's website address is <http://www.imf.org>.
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After the Executive Board approves a request for the use of Fund resources or completes
a review under an arrangement, the key points made by Executive Directors are summarized
in a statement by the Managing Director, which is released to the public. As the publication
of the statement coincides with a decision to support the requesting member's program,
the member is not expected to object.
The system of PINs, initially limited to Executive Board discussions in the context of
article IV consultations with members, has been extended to Executive Board discussions
on policy issues.
2. Standards
The development of standards and their implementation must be distinguished.
a. Development of Standards
The Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) developed by the Fund are metadata.
For example, on international reserves or external debt there were forty-seven subscribers
(out of 182) as of March 31, 1999. The General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) is
for countries not in a position to subscribe to the SDDS.
A "Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency-Declaration on Principles" has been
endorsed by the Interim Committee and approved by the Executive Board. A "Code of
Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Prin-
ciples" has been developed with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, national central
banks, and regulatory agencies. It was "adopted" by the Interim Committee at its meeting
on September 26, 1999 (the last one before its transformation into the International Mon-
etary and Financial Committee) "as a guide for members to increase transparency in the
conduct of these policies." 4 The Committee also urged "all members to implement the new
Code as well as the previously agreed Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency."5
The standards developed by the Fund are those that relate to its core activities.
Some are developed outside the Fund, with or without input from the Fund. These
include securities market regulation by the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO), insurance regulation by the International Association of Insurance Su-
pervisors (AIS), accounting regulation by the International Accounting Standards Com-
mittee (IASC), auditing regulation by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC),
and bankruptcy regulation by the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), which has adopted a model law on cross-border insolvency. The World
Bank organized a symposium on bankruptcy on September 14 and 15, 1999. The Fund's
Legal Department has published a staff report entitled "Orderly and Effective Insolvency
Procedures-Key Issues," which was prepared with the advice of experts and input from
other organizations, such as UNCITRAL for cross-border insolvency.6 The report discusses
the major issues raised by insolvency procedures on a comparative basis and makes rec-
ommendations, but does not formulate standards. A report on bank insolvency has also
been prepared by the Fund's Legal Department.
4. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles (Sept.
26, 1999) (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/ndex.htm>.
5. Id.
6. Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures-Key Issues (Aug. 2, 1999) (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm>.
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An OECD Task Force has prepared a document setting forth nonbinding principles on
corporate governance that are acceptable to its members, for consideration by nonmembers.
These principles have been endorsed by the OECD's Ministerial Council.
b. Implementation of Standards
The Fund will play a role in the implementation of standards relevant to its activities,
including those developed by other organizations, such as the Basle Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision or the 1988 Capital Accord. The Fund may provide technical
assistance to its members to help them implement relevant standards as they are developed
and to help them monitor their implementation through surveillance. The G-7 (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has recom-
mended the integration of standards in Fund surveillance and publication of transparency
reports. Consideration is being given to the gradual inclusion of standards on Fund con-
ditionality. In the context of the new Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility, the Fund will
take into account the requesting member's progress in implementing standards.
B. STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
The standards developed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Com-
mittee), the Basle Core Principles, and the Basle Capital Accord, and disseminated by the
Fund and the World Bank beyond the area covered by G-10 countries, need to be imple-
mented by national regulatory agencies. A Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has recently
been established under the auspices of the BIS to strengthen cooperation among interna-
tional organizations, national regulatory agencies, and expert groups. The work done by
the Fund and the World Bank in the area of banking legislation and assessment of countries'
financial systems, particularly the Financial Sector Liaison Committee established in Sep-
tember 1998 to coordinate the work of the Fund and the World Bank, is also relevant. The
legal environment within which banks operate-for example, secured transactions, judicial
system, civil procedure, property rights, contracts, and bankruptcy-has to be assessed on
a country-by-country basis. The Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks
participate in this collective effort. Particular attention is given to preventing bank insol-
vency and adopting adequate procedures for cases of bank insolvency. Finally, greater trans-
parency of the private sector in nonregulated activities such as hedge funds may be needed,
as these activities affect the financial sector. The banks are often the main providers of
resources to these highly leveraged operations, but unaware of the extent of the risks that
they are taking.
C. CAPITAL AccouNT ISSUES
Three aspects must be considered. The first is the liberalization of capital movements
through international agreements, either bilateral (bilateral investment treaties) or multi-
lateral (OECD Code on Capital Movements, European Community Treaty and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). The General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) contains provisions on the liberalization of capital movements related to the pro-
vision of certain services. Consideration is being given to a possible amendment of the
Fund's Articles of Agreement for a liberalization of capital movements. There has been
growing opposition to this idea, however, and the failure of the draft Multilateral Agreement
on Investments (MAI), which was prepared within the OECD, illustrates this opposition.
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Actually, the MAI went beyond the internal discussions of the Fund. These discussions
included a gradual extension of the OECD Code on Capital Liberalization to non-OECD
countries, without any exemption from local labor, environmental, and other laws for for-
eign investors. Moreover, the Fund's approach to capital liberalization could be based on a
gradual, voluntary process through which each member could determine the pace of its
progress toward liberalization and could, under certain conditions, reimpose restrictions.
The second aspect is the advice that may be given by the Fund to countries that decide
to liberalize capital inflows and outflows. Such liberalization requires proper sequencing,
beginning with a sound domestic financial system, a realistic exchange rate, noninflationary
monetary policies, moderate budget deficits, and avoidance of short-term foreign indebt-
edness in the banking and corporate sectors. Liberalization also means that controls should
be phased out, but how fast? Should they be retained on short-term inflows, which if
suddenly reversed, can have a destabilizing effect? How effective are exchange controls?
Can they be a substitute for more fundamental policy responses to a financial crisis? These
are all questions that must be answered.
The third aspect is the possibility that, without amending its Articles of Agreement, the
Fund could make liberalization of capital movements a condition of its financial assistance.
Whereas an amendment extending the Fund's jurisdiction would apply to all members, or
at least to all those accepting this extension if provision was made for individual acceptance,
the use of Fund conditionality would only affect members using the Fund's resources. Since
Fund conditionality cannot be used to add to members' obligations under the Articles of
Agreement, the liberalization could be short-lived. Once a member no longer used the
Fund's resources, it could reinstate restrictions on capital movements.
There are a number of legal objections to this approach. The first is that while the Articles
of Agreement explicitly authorize the Fund to make the imposition of restrictions on capital
outflows a condition of its financial assistance, they do not give the Fund the same power
with respect to liberalization.7 They even specifically state that a member has a right to
restrict capital movements. 8 Moreover, the Fund's conditionality must be consistent with
the Fund's purposes as stated in article I, which do not include the liberalization of capital
movements. Therefore, under the present Articles of Agreement, Fund conditionality can-
not be used to liberalize capital movements. Nothing prevents the Fund, however, in the
context of its surveillance or the use of its resources, to explain the benefits of capital
liberalization (for example, to attract foreign investments) to a member, but the member is
free to take or disregard that advice.
D. INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN FORESTALLING AND RESOLVING CRISES
The Fund is not a lender of last resort. Its liquidity is limited and its financial assistance
is not confined to systemic cases, although there have been attempts to create facilities that
would be used only by major countries, i.e., those creating systemic risks; but it would have
been contrary to the principle of uniform treatment of members. Nevertheless, the "moral
hazard" inherent in a lender of last resort's function has to be faced by the Fund. The
provision of public funds to repay private creditors allows debtor countries to borrow at a
7. See Articles of Agreement, sipra note 1, art. VI, § 1.
8. See id. § 3.
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discounted rate in order to pay expensive interest rates. Also, the assurance that these funds
will be available in case of need to "bail out" the debtor country and its creditors encourages
irresponsible behavior among borrowers and lenders alike.
Should the Fund engage in punitive actions, for example, by objecting to full repayment
of all or certain creditors by sovereign debtors? Should it request (as it is authorized to do
by its Articles of Agreement) the imposition of capital controls to prevent payments by
private sector debtors, or limit the use of its resources to the service of specified debts?
In the early 1980s, the Fund's policy was to suspend its financial assistance to a country
that was in arrears to its public or private creditors. This policy applied to both arrears of
the private sector due to exchange controls and sovereign arrears. In 1989, it was concluded
that this policy created an incentive for foreign creditors to refuse any concessions. It was
then decided that the Fund should be prepared to provide, when circumstances warranted,
financing in cases of arrears to commercial banks. In 1998, this policy was generalized to
bondholders and the rest of the private sector. This "lending into arrears" policy creates a
risk that the member receiving resources from the Fund will use them (or their equivalent
since money is fungible) to repay its private sector creditors. The program established by
the member and the Fund's conditionality applicable to the program may prevent or limit
a "bail out"of private creditors.
Lending into arrears does not, however, resolve the debtor country's predicament. Unless
it is willing to lose its access to capital markets, at least temporarily, it has to reach agreement
with its creditors. A moratorium or standstill will not achieve that result, but a good faith
attempt to negotiate a rescheduling, perhaps with a reduction in principal or a lower interest
rate sweetened by repayment guarantees (for example, financing from the Fund and the World
Bank as with the Brady bonds), will help. Such a "bail-in" of private creditors is important
for proper financing of Fund-supported programs and the Fund may insist on it.
Should bond issues contain renegotiation clauses? English-style bonds do, but New York-
style bonds do not. A 1996 G-10 report recommended including "majority restructuring"
and "collective representation" clauses, as in English-style Trust Deed bonds, in interna-
tional bond issues. Should there be "rollover clauses" in short-term international loan agree-
ments like, for example, Korea's experience of replacing banks' debts with sovereign guar-
anteed bonds? Should there be private contingent credit lines? Finally, should the most
debtor friendly provision in the Fund's Articles-namely, article VIII, section 2(b)-be
revitalized through interpretation or amendment to make exchange controls on private
debtors (and standstills on sovereign debt) more effective as the ultimate defense for the
indebted country while negotiations with creditors are taking place? It could also be used,
in cases where agreement is reached with a majority of creditors, to avoid litigation by
rogue creditors.
E. SYSTEMIC ISSUES
Systemic issues are traditionally part of the Fund's activities but are now receiving greater
attention: the implications of capital mobility and exchange rate volatility are being studied;
new facilities have been created to combat systemic crises (the Supplemental Reserve Fa-
cility in 1998 and the Contingent Credit Line in 1999); and additional resources have been
made available to the Fund-a general quota increase became effective in early 1999. The
New Arrangements to Borrow became effective on November 17, 1998, raising to SDR 34
billion (about $46 billion U.S. dollars) the amounts that may be borrowed by the Fund.
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II. The Instruments
Three main instruments may be used by the Fund to achieve these objectives: technical
assistance, surveillance, and conditionality. To make them more effective, a number of in-
stitutional changes have been considered and some have already been made.
A. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(b))
Little needs to be said here, except that technical assistance is provided by the Fund only
if it is requested. There is no obligation for a country to request the Fund's technical
assistance or to carry out the Fund's recommendations. For instance, a member may request
the Fund's assistance to modernize its banking laws, its statistical system, its fiscal policies,
or its exchange controls.
B. SURVEILLANCE (ARTICLE IV)
Surveillance applies to all countries but is limited to their economic, financial, and ex-
change policies. The Fund's practice also includes trade policies in the consultation process.
Surveillance does not apply to members' political or social policies, although the distinction
is not always clear (for example, labor policies are discussed by the Fund). At the end of
each article IV consultation, the Fund should adopt "conclusions" that are part of the
dialogue with each member. As noted above, these conclusions are not published without
the member's consent.
Article IV consultations are essentially an exercise of peer pressure on each member
country. If they are published, public opinion pressure could come into play, but then, as
experience shows in the context of other organizations, there is a risk of greater politici-
zation of the consultation process. This is because the member may try to influence the
substance of the Fund's conclusions to avoid a negative assessment of its policies. As noted
above, the staff report prepared for the consultation is not published without the member's
consent.
C. CONDITIONALITY (ARTICLE V, SECTION 3)
Conditionality applies only to users of Fund resources and its only limits are (i) consis-
tency with the Fund's purposes, which are economic and financial but not political, and
(ii) safeguarding the Fund's resources. "Beggars can't be choosers." As the Fund is less and
less a cooperative, where each member may go from a creditor to a debtor position, and it
uses more and more of developed countries' contributions to assist other countries, there
is a natural trend toward a polarized vision of the Fund's conditionality-too strict accord-
ing to debtors, too soft according to creditors. The latter will insist on Fund policies that
safeguard their contributions and ensure that their use is limited to cases worthy of their
support. For instance, the recent U.S. legislation on the Fund's quota increase is essentially
a list of what a major creditor country wishes that users of Fund resources were required
to do or refrain from doing as a condition of Fund assistance (for example, the right to
establish trade unions and nondiscrimination against foreign lenders in bankruptcies). At
the behest of creditor countries, the scope of Fund conditionality has gradually expanded.
In practice, however, a balance has to be struck between taking the opportunity of a
major crisis in a country's external sector to impose wide-ranging reforms and taking the
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risk of difficult, protracted negotiations during which the country's economy will deterio-
rate and the population will suffer. Perhaps the best example of the use of Fund condition-
ality in the context of the new architecture is the April 23, 1999 decision creating the
Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility. The new facility is intended to benefit countries
that have adequate policies, but are unexpectedly subject to "contagion," i.e., a sudden lack
of confidence that, like a cyclone that originated elsewhere, is affecting their external po-
sitions with a massive capital outflow. The Supplemental Reserve Facility had been created
to remedy the sudden outflow, but the CCL adds protection against the contagion effect.
In order to be eligible for a CCL, a member must meet numerous conditions, including
standards and relations with its creditors. These conditions are still loosely formulated in
the policy, to take into account the fact that the new architecture is still more a blueprint
than a reality. This is also because, if the conditions were too strict, not a single country
would be eligible.
The extension of Fund conditionality raises a number of legal issues. One of them is
whether or to what extent the Fund's conditionality may be used to achieve the objectives
of other organizations. For instance, some members have refused to adhere to certain ILO
conventions or have imposed measures inconsistent with certain commitments under WTO
conventions. The principle is that cross-conditionality is prohibited. The Fund was not
established to enforce other treaties or to force its members to adhere to other treaties. If
the Fund concludes, however, that certain reforms need to be made to give effect to its own
purposes, the fact that these actions will give effect to other treaties (for example, trade
liberalization) cannot bar the Fund from making them a condition of its financial assistance.
Nevertheless, as explained above, Fund conditionality cannot be used to impose obligations.
Therefore, adherence to a legally binding international agreement could not be part of
Fund conditionality.
D. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES (ARTICLE XII)
There are presently two main policy-making organs in the Fund: the Board of Governors
(plenary organ) and the Executive Board (limited membership). In addition, the Interim
Committee, which is an advisory body of the Board of Governors (structured like the
Executive Board), tends to act increasingly as the supervisory organ to which the Executive
Board reports twice a year. In the fall of 1999, the Interim Committee was transformed to
become the International Monetary and Financial Committee. Its advisory role has been
expanded to include the international monetary and financial system.
In order to strengthen the role of the committee, it was agreed that meetings of its
members, who are finance ministers or central bank governors, could be preceded by meet-
ings of their deputies. No agreement was reached, however, on the desirability of estab-
lishing working groups within the committee.
As a result of these decisions, the proposal to establish a council, as contemplated in the
Articles of Agreement, is no longer under consideration, although it had mustered some
support. Other proposals, such as a merger of the Interim Committee with the Develop-
ment Committee, had also been considered, but found little support within the Fund.
Although the Executive Board remains legally the main decision-making organ of the
Fund (essentially because of the delegation of powers given by the Board of Governors),
its effective role is declining. The decision to hold meetings of deputies of the finance
ministers and central bank governors confirms this evolution toward greater direct involve-
ment of governments in the policy-making process within the Fund.
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Another evolution is becoming manifest, which is the trend toward groupings of countries
outside the Fund's structure. Traditionally, the G-10 have played an important role in the
coordination of their policies, both within the Fund and outside.9 Gradually, however, other
groupings have emerged. The G-7 hold frequent meetings where monetary and financial
policies are discussed and common positions are determined. Their combined voting power
within the Fund makes them a key element in steering the Fund's policies. The 1998 U.S.
quota increase legislation illustrates the role of the G-7 in the Fund: the U.S. participation
in the general quota increase would only become effective if "the major shareholders of the
Fund" (i.e., the G-7) had "publicly agreed to, and [would] act to implement in the Fund"
the policies specified in the legislation. Once this assurance was given, the U.S. authorities
consented to the quota increase.
More recently, the G-20, a group of "systemically important countries," has been estab-
lished under the leadership of the United States. Unlike the G-7, it includes a number of
emerging countries, but it does not include those of the G-10 countries that are not also
members of the G-7. These groupings' existence naturally creates some resentment among
those that are not invited to participate, as they feel that major decisions are effectively
made without consulting with them. These decisions, however, often have an impact on
them, particularly when they are called upon to finance their implementation through con-
tributions to the Fund.
A common justification for these groupings' existence is that they ensure better repre-
sentation, as they allow the real decision-makers of the countries to participate directly in
their activities. Most Executive Directors of the Fund are elected by constituencies of several
countries and cannot speak authoritatively for any of them. It is also said that the Fund's
voting structure is obsolete as it is based on members' quotas and quota increases, which
are largely made on a uniform basis because they require a very high majority of the total
voting power and do not reflect the current economic and financial strengths of Fund
members.
For a universal organization like the Fund, this trend toward limited groupings within
its membership raises a difficult challenge and imposes a real strain on its internal coher-
ence. It also shows how difficult it is for a monetary institution to reconcile the principle
of equality of nations under international law with the reality of their unequal economic
and financial weights.
9. The G-10 includes the member countries that agreed to lend to the Fund directly or through their
central banks under the General Arrangements to Borrow: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, ItalyJapan,
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and later Switzerland.
VOL. 34, NO. 1
